Abstracts

The Evolution and Function of Reasoning

Mario Piazza , Nevia Dolcini Università degli Studi 'G. d'Annunzio' Chieti e Pescara , University of Macau

In this talk we critically discuss two main evolutionary rationales for reasoning's existence: the classical, or ‘Cartesian’, view, according to which the principal function of reasoning is to improve individual cognition, and the so called 'argumentative theory' -- recently proposed by Mercier and Sperber -- whereby reasoning evolved for argumentative purposes in a social context. We begin with dismissing the classical view as implausible, especially in relation to the corrective role it ascribes to logic. Moreover, we emphasize some misunderstandings about the nature of logic in the mainstream cognitive psychology which have produced a black-and-white view of logic, making it largely irrelevant to cognition. Then, we consider the argumentative theory of reasoning, contending that, its intrinsic merits notwithstanding, its predictive power is weaker than it is claimed by the authors. In particular, we argue that the theory fails to take proper measure of the confirmation bias in an evolutionary perspective. Finally, it is sketched an alternative evolutionary explanation for the existence of reasoning, whereby to have confirmation bias is adaptive.