Abstracts

Three Grades of Rational Involvement

Marco J. Nathan University of Denver

Echoing Quine's famous distinction between three `grades of modal involve- ment,' this essay identi es and distinguishes three grades of rational involve- ment that underlie substantial questions such as what it means to be rational and under what conditions does it become appropriate to revise our norms of rationality. In the rst part, I present my trichotomy. The rst grade is a criterial conception of rationality according to which there are institutionalized norms which de ne what is or is not rationally acceptable. The second grade involves the possibility of revising norms of rationality by appealing to a more fundamental set of rules. The third degree of rational involvement consists in replacing a set of norms of rationality with a di erent set that is deemed more fundamental. In the second part, I argue that my trichotomy is not merely an idle taxonomy, but it can be used to frame and assess substantive debates, such as the one between neoclassical economists and neuroeconomists, or that between philosophers and psychologists on the `naturalization' of rationality.