Abstracts

Paradoxes of self-deception

Carla Bagnoli University of Modena-Reggio Emilia, University of Oslo

Self-deception is the acquisition and retention of a belief despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. This is a pervasive phenomenon that philosophers tend to treat as a case of irrationality, and in extreme cases a pathology that impedes self-knowledge and incurs moral sanction. Indeed, this is partly the reason why self-deception is paradoxical. On the one hand, it is a moral charge, hence it applies to someone for something one does; on the other hand, it implies lack of the relevant sort of self-knowledge that the applicability of moral sanctions seems to imply.

The question I address is what kind of irrationality self-deception represents, and what moral consequences it carries for the self-deceptive agent. I will argue that self-deception is not merely a pathological phenomenon, but a defensive strategy that is functional to maintaining the stability of the self. As such, the phenomenon of self-deception must be evaluated according different dimensions of rationality. My starting point is to take self-deception as a practical rather than a theoretical phenomenon. Its philosophical interest resides in the relation that the agent bears to her reasons to believe, rather than in the issue of whether she accurately represents the world and her mind as independent objects. I speculate that self-deception is more similar to alienation than to interpersonal deception in this regard. In both cases, agential authority is at stake, that is, the authority that the agent claims on her action.